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Transcript 
 
Chris Beam:  ... meeting which takes place on August 16, 1990 at 9:00 AM.  Senator Muskie, I 
wanted to, ah, Secretary of State Muskie, I wanted to ask you, get this discussion going, about 
the circumstances of your appointment as Secretary of State in the spring of 1980.  When was 
the first inkling, what was the first inkling you had that President Carter was considering you as 
Secretary of State? 
 
Edmund S. Muskie:  Well, the first knowledge I had was when he asked m  to become 
Secretary of State.  I was not aware that there was a vacancy at the time, I’d been traveling 
across the country, campaigning in Arizona for Morris [K.] Udall, Colorado for Gary Hart, and I 
was on my way to Nashville, Tennessee to make a speech on water pollution.  And on the way, 
when the plane stopped in St. Louis, there was a . . .  I got notice that the White House was 
calling.  I got off the plane and returned the call, but the White House switchboard did not know 
who it was who was trying to reach me.  So I went on o Nashville and there was a call at the 
airport there, too, and the same thing.  I called the White House switchboard and they didn’t 
know who was trying to reach me.  Incredibly.  It wasn’t until late that evening, about eleven 
o’clock, when I had completed my speech in Nashville that I returned to my hotel room and the 
President reached me there.1   
 
Even at that point I did not know there was a vacancy so I didn’t know that he was considering 
me.  I thought maybe he was calling me about a possible fishing trip in Maine.  I knew he was, 
he was a rabid fisherman and we had talked about fishing, so I thought maybe that’s why he was 
calling.  It was spring after all.  But then suddenly he asked me if I would be his Secretary of 
State.  It came as a, like a bolt out of the blue.  I was, as I say, I wasn’t aware there was a 
vacancy, let alone that he was considering me.  So I think there was a noticeable silence for a 
few seconds and he asked me what I thought of it and I said, well, it had some appeal but that I’d 
have to think about it, and so he asked me, “What,” you know, “what, how much time I would 
have to have and I said, “Well, I’ve got to talk to my accountant, I’ve got to talk to my wife, I’ve 
got to talk to the governor of the state and make up my own mind.”  So we agreed that we would 
discuss it the next day, that I would return to Washington and then let him know.  But he, he 
called me at six o’clock the next morning, when I was still in Nashville in my hotel room, said he 
was on his way to Texas and he could stop and pick me up so that we could talk on the way to 
Texas, and I told him really I didn’t have to talk to him, I had to talk to my wife and my 
accountant and so on, and so on.  So we agreed that af er I’d done that the next day I would, I 
would get in touch with him.   
 
But the only factor that was unfinished by the time I had talked to my accountant, I wanted to, 
because I understood my income would be sharply reduced.  I’d have to cut off my lecture, 
lecture schedule, and that was an important source of income to me in those days, and also I 
would not get the full salary of a Cabinet member bcause I had voted for the most recent 
increase.  So I had to go over my finances very carefully.  And I had done that and we agreed 
                                                
1 A section called “Trips” in the miscellaneous index binder to the collection (SE 3117) is where to find a listing for the 
trip that included Arizona, Colorado and Nashville, T nnessee from April 25-28, 1980.  The speech index lists the 
Nashville speech as April 28, 1980 on the subject of Earth Day and the Clean Water Act.  This speech can be found at 
the following location in the collection: SE 3224 (last speech in last folder). 
that I could probably manage for the rest of that year at least, through the election and until the 
end of Carter’s term.  And my wife was thoroughly in agreement with my taking the, taking the 
appointment.  But then I had to get in touch with the governor, because I wanted to protect my 
staff and I wanted to ask the governor to. . . . Well, in the first place, I think as a courtesy to him, 
since he had to make the appointment to fill the vacancy, he ought to know anyway.  But I 
wanted him to take up with my successor, whoever he might appoint, the matter of keeping my 
staff at least until the election.  So I called thegovernor the next day, I didn’t tell him what it was 
about because he was having a dinner at the governor’s mansion with a number of newspaper 
reporters, and I didn’t want him spreading the word, so I arranged to meet him at the Brunswick 
Naval Air Station the next day. . . . the President made a White House plane available to me.  
Came up to Brunswick, discussed the matter with him.  He was thoroughly supportive.  He went 
over his list of possible candidates with me to get my reaction.  I told him that really it was his 
decision to make.  I was sure he’d be interested in appointing someone whom he believed to be 
qualified, but that was his decision.  I declined to give my reaction to any proposal he had.  And 
he of course would be running for reelection himself, so he ought to be concerned about the 
pulling power of the senatorial candidate.   
 
CB:  Now, when you said that you were not aware that there was a vacancy, had the aborted 
military raid to rescue the hostages taken place? 
 
EM:  Oh, yes.  That, as a matter of fact, [Cyrus] Vance had submitted his resignation to the 
president before the raid took place because he disagreed with that decision.  But he agreed to 
withhold his resignation until the attempt had been made.  But the raid had been made, and it had 
failed, well, the raid that had been attempted had failed.  Uh, and the news of his resignation had 
been made public, because Jane had heard about it back home.  The White House had been 
calling her to find out where I was, and they didn’t tell her why, why the president was trying to 
get hold of me, but she guessed correctly what it was.  So the raid, yeah, the raid was history and 
the resignation had been submitted and made public, but it simply had escaped my notice 
because I was busy traveling.  So then I notified the, he governor had given me his assurance 
that he would try to protect my staff, and out of our discussion he ultimately offered the 
appointment to Senator Mitchell.  And although Mitchell had been appointed District Judge and 
had been serving about six months, he was more than eager to take the appointment, so that it all 
worked out pretty well. 
 
CB:  Now, in 1980 you were a well-respected senior member of the United States Senate and it 
was clear in the spring of 1980 that the Carter administration was in deep trouble over the Iran 
hostage crisis. 
 
EM:  And inflation. 
 
CB:  And inflation.  But, I mean, the administration was getting really a double whammy and 
clearly foreign policy was the major problem.  Did you have any sense of trepidation about 
leaving the Senate to go to the State Department, to join an administration that was in deep 
political trouble over a major foreign policy crisis? 
 
EM:  No, not really.  In the first place, in the first place, to be asked by a president, you know, to 
assume this particular position in the circumstances, you know, a crisis, you know, I regard as a 
distinct honor and one that I couldn’t lightly say no to.  I mean, it was obviously a very serious 
matter from the country’s point of view, as well as the president’s political point of view, so I 
took that into account.  But in addition, I had long believed that I would not want to run for 
reelection after I reached the age of seventy.  Well, my next election I would have been, let’s see, 
this would have been in ‘82, I would have been sixty-eight.  So that, to run again wouldn’t  have 
violated my principle, if you can call it a principle.  But in addition to that, the financial burden 
of being in the Senate was becoming very heavy, and I wasn’t sure I wanted to run for another 
term.  But I felt that if I stayed in the Senate that I would be pressured to run again, because 
people would probably conclude that if I didn’t run, we might lose that seat as a party and that I 
might yield to the pressure to run again when I really thought the time had come when I probably 
should not.   
 
So Carter’s invitation really gave me a graceful way to avoid that decision, and to have the 
experience of serving as Secretary of State in these unusual circumstances, so it looked to me 
like an opportunity.  I realized that he could lose th  election and that my tenure would be eight 
short months, but that didn’t really trouble me.  I would have liked to have served for another 
Carter term as president, but that isn’t the way the ball bounced.  So I have no regrets today that I 
did it, and had no qualms about doing it then.  There was something of an effort made, you 
know, to persuade me, to allow my name to be put in, nomination, at the convention for 
president as Carter’s political problems deepened i the course of the next months.  But I 
discouraged that, absolutely. 
 
CB:  Who made these efforts, these, put out these feelrs? 
 
EM:  Well, it was a number of people.  I don’t really know who the ringleaders were, but there 
were a number of people.  I know Edward Bennett Williams worked, did a lot of work trying to 
do that.  I had discussions with him.  Arnold Picker, who had been a strong supporter in ‘72, and 
who had contributed a great, a lot of money to thatcampaign.  There were others.  My memory 
is not as sharp as it ought to be on the names.  They also tried, I think there was some effort 
made to try to persuade Senator [Henry M.] Jackson [D-WA] to lend his name to that effort.  I 
think money was raised for such an effort. 
 
CB:  You mean before they contacted you about the possibility ... 
 
EM:  Well, this was sort of an ongoing effort for a few, I mean, they never got any 
encouragement from me at all, but that did not discourage them from pursuing it so that I was 
aware of it, the press was aware of it.  I, over a period of a couple of months there, I couldn’t 
avoid the question from time to time from the press a  to whether or not I was interested or 
whether or not I would accept.  And I’d made it clear from the beginning that when I said yes to 
the president’s invitation to appoint me to the job, that implicitly I was renouncing it, although I 
had no idea when he offered me the appointment that here would be this little boomlet.  But it 
occurred and if I had had any inclination to seek the presidency at that time, I certainly wouldn’t 
have accepted the appointment. 
 
CB:  Now, this boomlet occurred when?  Just before ...? 
 
EM:  Before the election, before the convention.  When was the convention? 
 
CB:  Oh, I see, while you were Secretary of State. 
 
EM:  While I was secretary of state, oh yeah.  I mean, I was appointed in May and the 
convention was, what, August?  In August? 
 
CB:  I think so. 
 
EM:  So it was in that period.  It wasn’t a very long period.  But I got off to a good start as 
Secretary of State.  The reaction to my appointment was very positive everywhere that I could 
see, and so it was natural, I guess, the Kennedy candid cy hadn’t really gotten off the ground.  
He’d run into trouble, particularly because of his unfortunate interview with Roger Mudd.  You 
remember that interview that. . . .  
 
CB:  I remember it, but I don’t remember all the details. . . .  
 
EM:  Mudd asked him why he was running for president, a d Kennedy fumbled badly on his 
answer to that question.  As I remember it, it was quite, a very visible political setback for 
Kennedy, the fact that he didn’t really know why he was running.  So his candidacy hadn’t 
gotten off the ground.  There was, I don’t think there was any real doubt that Carter would get 
the nomination at the convention, but there were those who thought that another candidacy at 
that point, myself or Jackson, might succeed and put the party in a stronger position.   
 
CB:  Now, in the CBS documentary, CBS, WCSH documentary on you, your wife Jane also 
commented that in 1980 you had reached a kind of emtional dead end as far as the Senate was 
concerned.  That you had, you felt that you were ready to move on in terms of what you could 
accomplish within the Senate, that you felt frustrated and that this offer of the Secretary of State 
position was really kind of a windfall.  To what ext nt did you feel as though you had reached a 
kind of peak in the Senate? 
 
EM:  Well, I don’t know that I felt that, although she may have read my mood better than I did.  
I mean, I found it a very welcome event for the reasons I’ve already given you, but in terms of 
losing enthusiasm for work in the Senate, I don’t recall that I had reached that point.  There 
really wasn’t much in terms of advancement in a political sense that was left to me except, you 
know, continue to do a job as a senator. 
  
The budget process was still very much under challenge.  We’d done a good job, I think.  At the 
time I left the Senate we had reduced the national, the deficit to something like twenty-billion 
dollars.  Contrast that with the present two-hundred, two-hundred and fifty-billion dollars.  So, 
we thought we had taken that process pretty well along the road to success but it was still under, 
it was still being tested.  There was still a lot to be done to improve it and to solidify it and to 
really make it’s impact.  I think the Reagan administration in effect destroyed the potential 
effectiveness of that budget process.  It’s been substit ted, in fact, by the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings law, which to me isn’t a process at all.  It’s an artificial cap on the deficit that it is easy 
for Congress to evade.  And the trouble with it is that it didn’t really, it doesn’t really address the 
issue of what our priorities are to be in spending.  I mean, you can’t, if you just put an arbitrary 
top to your deficit, then there’s the, you know, the priorities question which is the really tough 
budget problem, the priorities.  You know, what interests do you serve with government 
resources?  Education, health, environment, defense?  As you know, the budget all too often 
develops as a contest between those who believe in soc al spending of one kind or another, and 
those who believe in defense.  Well, that’s an oversimplification, really, of what it is.  But the 
first group is divided among a lot of sub groups: those interested in education, those interested in 
health, those interested in environment, those interes d in jobs and so on.  So there’s a lot of 
work still to be done on the budget process, and I thought we had done very well on my side.  
Senator Henry Bellman of Oklahoma, who was in effect the Republican manager of the Senate 
Budget Committee, and I had worked well together and I think we’d achieved considerable 
success and I think we would have continued to if I had stayed on.   
 
So I didn’t feel really that we had exhausted the callenges to me personally of that process, and 
of course the environmental process hadn’t come to a dead end.  It was growing and, as you 
know, it is even a bigger issue today than it was when I left the Senate ten years ago.  So my 
areas of interest were still very much alive, but in the sense, I was uneasy about, maybe that’s 
what Jane interpreted to mean that I was tired of the Senate or it opportunities.  I felt very much 
burdened by our financial condition and wondered how long we could sustain our family and 
educate our kids and all the rest of it.  So in that sense perhaps I reflected a mood that persuaded 
her that I really wasn’t getting much more satisfaction out of the job.  That’s a rambling answer. 
 
CB:  That’s fine.  One question that came to mind was, right after your swearing in as Secretary 
of State, I’m curious as to what particular steps you took to assimilate yourself into the job under 
very unusual circumstances.  You were obviously faced with the Iran hostage crisis, not to 
mention the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, plus the usual, all the other issues that would face 
a Secretary of State.  What particular steps, concrete steps, did you take or were taken for you to 
get you into the job in May of 1980?   
 
EM:  Well, of course I was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time and 
had been for a number of years so at least from a Sen te point of view, I was involved in all of 
the visible issues, or the active issues, so I suppose I had that background which someone who 
hadn’t been in the position wouldn’t have had.  And of course we had to plunge immediately 
into, you know, I had to plunge immediately into the management of foreign policy across the 
board.  That’s one of the advantages of the State Department, the Foreign Service people in the 
State Department of course ensure that there’s continuity in the State Department and foreign 
policy on an ongoing basis. And I knew a lot of those people, and so I plunged in and I didn’t 
have to, I didn’t have the option of putting together a team in the State Department to, that 
reflected my priorities.  That team was in place.  
  
And the first important decision I made there that I think was a response to your question, was 
the deputy secretary of state.  Warren Christopher had definitely been an approp-, been under 
consideration as, or on the list of those who were, deserved and got consideration for the 
appointment as secretary.  And I knew Chris, admired him tremendously, and he, before I talked 
to him, had decided I think to leave the State Department and I persuaded him to stay.  And that I 
think was very important in terms, because Chris and I developed a very good personal 
relationship.  And he was my immediate key to tying i  to all of the ongoing issues and the 
management of the State Department.  He was an invaluable assistant.   
 
And Vance had assembled a very good team of people in th  top spots, the top leadership spots 
in the State Department, and we established a working relationship immediately.  And I think it 
was helpful that I was prepared to accept the personnel structure as it was.  I just accepted them 
and I told them so.  I said, look, you’ve got to take me in this crisis, in these circumstances, this 
emergency, as I am, and I’m prepared to take you, too, so let’s work together.  There was never 
any, I left no doubt whatsoever that I wasn’t looking, you know, for patronage positions to put 
people into, that I was willing to take the State Dpartment as it was.  And I think that worked 
very well.  Now, to this day I get the impression that my willingness to do so really created a 
positive environment in the State Department that served me, it served the State Department, 
served the president and served the country.  So they were all there. 
 
They didn’t, they all knew me or of me, and they all respected me for what I had been up to that 
point.  And the fact that I was willing, you know, to just step right into harness with them to 
work eliminated any uncertainty as to their own status or what the impact might be on them 
personally, or their position.  So we jumped right into harness together and that was, you know I 
met, there was a group of eight that I met with every morning at eight o’clock and then once a 
week I would meet with people at the assistant secretary or ambassadorial level who were out of 
town, and I converted that into a different kind of arrangement.  Up to that time, those meetings 
were held for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to report to the secretary as to what was 
happening in their areas.  I converted it into another kind of forum.  I used them to test all the 
questions that I had to consider at the secretarial leve .  In other words, I asked for their 
judgment on the decisions that I had under consideration and had to deal with.  And it was 
interesting to watch them react to that.  They were not there just to give their own view of their 
particular little piece of the pie, but they were th re to, you know, I was, I clearly had an interest 
in what they thought about the big picture, and it was very helpful. 
 
CB:  Now, when you came in, were you given briefing books, piles of documents to sort of 
update you on which departments. . . . ? 
 
EM:  Oh, this was a daily business, not necessarily related to fact that I had come in and needed 
to get caught up.  You had to start reading immediat ly.  I mean, the daily input of, because all 
these issues are pending on a day-to-day basis and it did involve a lot of reading.  The Secretary 
of State can’t possibly personally deal with all the cable traffic that moves into the State 
Department.  So I had good people who screened that to make sure that I got the important 
things, the things that I had to absolutely be in touch with, but there were massive amounts of 
detail on issues that probably did not come to my attention.  And that’s why Christopher’s 
position as deputy was important and the seven or eight other positions at that level.   
 
I mean, they all had their share of the cable traffic to deal with and my name went, you ought to 
read, the best answer to your question I think is found in Dean Rusk’s new book.  He discusses 
in great detail the kind of problems a secretary has in dealing with just the total mass of 
information that passes through the State Department.  The State Department is really a 
communications center, you know, this information flowing from around the world twenty four 
hours a day and there have to be people who intercept it here, there and elsewhere, make sure 
that it all, the key questions get to the secretary’s attention.  It’s quite an operation.  And of 
course, the hostage crises had complicated that.  We had a special section dealing with just the 
hostage crisis involving some of the spouses of the people who were hostages in Iran.  I forget 
what that was called.  But it worked well.   
 
And of course, so far as my, you know, I had to begin traveling almost immediately.  I mean, the 
Secretary of State today does even more than we did in those days.  But almost immediately 
there was, there were meetings in Brussels, NATO ministerial meetings, the Austrian State 
Treaty, a celebration in May, there was a Venice economic summit that was approaching in June, 
an (unintelligible word) conference in Southeast Asia in late June, and so on.  So there wasn’t 
much time to sit at my desk in Washington and read r ports or cable traffic and whatnot.   
 
CB:  One thing, I was looking back over some of the backgrounds of former secretaries of state, 
and in a way your background is unusual because you had a career as an elected official, as a 
politician, throughout most of your adult life.  And that was not the case with Secretary Vance, 
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Kissinger, Rogers, the only others that I can think of would be 
Christian Herter under Eisenhower, or [Sic] [Charles] Evans Hughs in the 1920s.   
 
EM:  Don’t overlook Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull. 
 
CB:  Cordell Hull, okay.  Do you think this gave you a different perspective than most of your 
predecessors in terms of your approach, your relations with Congress, the press, with your 
understanding of the dynamics of international relations? 
 
EM:  Well, undoubtedly it did.  Of course in the early days, you know, at the beginnings of the 
Republic, the Secretary of State was a political figure.  He was, usually the president, vice 
president and secretary of state were perhaps the thre most important political figures of their 
time, beginning with Washington, Washington, Adams, Jefferson as secretary of state.  If you go 
through the first fifty or more years of the country’s history, secretary of state was usually 
chosen from the ranks of political leaders.  And as a matter of fact, by law he was the third in, or 
the second in line of succession to the presidency, and I think that was true until after I reached 
the Senate.  I forget when it was precisely that the line of succession was changed to substitute 
the speaker of the house, the President Pro Temp [of the senate] for the Secretary of State on 
down.  But yes, I think it did in terms of the most recent incumbents of the state department, I 
was an exception.  
 
Well, there was Cordell Hull, there was former Senator [James] Byrnes who was secretary after 
the war, I guess the three of us.  Hull, I guess, came from the House, Byrnes came from the 
Senate and I was from the Senate.  It did, it, and I think it made a difference in some important 
ways.  I know [Zbigniew] Brzezinski, you know, who created many problems for [Cyrus] Vance, 
had a different view of me, because he understood that one of the reasons that Carter appointed 
me was because I had a political base.  And in a way that, I don’t want to use the word 
intimidated him, but he took it into account in hisown assertions of turf, for example.  Although 
he was never a comfortable person to work with in that respect.  We got along personally all 
right, although we haven’t had a personal relationship of any kind since I left, since I left public 
life.   
 
And of course with respect to the Congress, you know, the Congress respected my, respected me 
totally.  I never had any troubles with the Congress.  I found it easy to communicate with them, I 
knew them.  And. . . . in my appearances before committees and so on, I felt completely at home 
and they responded in kind.  And I think even in the State Department and also in my relations 
with, you know, my counterparts in other countries, the fact that I came from the Senate I think 
added a dimension to my position that was a plus.  They regarded me as a political leader of the 
country, not just simply as secretary of state, so it was important in very many ways.   
 
No, I felt that my eight months plus as secretary was regarded as a plus and a positive period by 
everybody concerned so far as I can see.  I never flt that people were disappointed in my 
handling of the job.  They seemed to be, have a feeling of assurance because I was there, and that 
was true wherever I went or whatever group I was with.   
 
CB:  Now, you mentioned that you had some problems with national security advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  What were some of those problems?  Were they turf questions, were there 
differences in pers-, philosophical differences, approaches to foreign policy?   
 
EM:  Well, there was a, no, the questions of, the questions such as holding press conferences on 
foreign policy.  There’s nothing that Brzezinski lied more than that limelight and the trouble 
with it was that, you know, his articulation of a policy at any point would always be compared 
with the secretary’s articulation.  And to the extent that people perceived a difference, it creates 
confusion.  He also met with representatives of other countries.  Well, he always felt there was a 
temptation for people, representatives from other countries, to shop for the best point of view 
they could get.  I mean, not that every time he had a press conference and every time he met with 
a foreign leader that that necessarily led to a sharp breach between the national security advisor 
and the secretary of state, but the potential was there.  Of course, reporters who specialized in 
foreign policy, who dealt with both, you know, would like to play games with that kind of a 
relationship.  Now, I don’t think he, I don’t think he did it as much with me as he did with Vance 
because he understood this was an election year for the president and the president couldn’t 
afford to lose another secretary of state.  And besides, this secretary of state had a political 
following of his own, so I think that his inclinations along that line cooled somewhat, or he held 
them in restraint, for whatever reason.  But he still was an abrasive kind of a guy to deal with.  
He was very sure of his own opinions.  We used to have some, in. . . . we took turns chairing 
foreign policy meetings and we used to have some pretty sharp exchanges.   
 
CB:  Were these differences over the ...? 
 
EM:  The differences over the management of the Middle East, crises, the Afghanistan situation, 
the Polish situation.  I mean, all of those came up d ring that eight month period.  Never resulted 
in any break, it was just, it was just not a very comfortable arrangement.  And apparently in 
Vance’s case, after three years, he had a belly ful, especially on that Afghanistan, on that rescue 
mission.   
 
End of Side A 
Side B 
 
CB:  Okay, concerning the Iran hostage crisis, how did you feel about the military raid when it 
occurred?  Did you, had you thought it was advisable to even try it?  I realize in retrospect it 
might because it was aborted, that it might seem a bad idea, but what was your opinion, both as a 
senator and once you were in the State Department, about the advisability of this raid? 
 
EM:  Well, I felt that, I felt that the president would have been remiss in his response, in the 
discharge of his responsibilities if he hadn’t, if he hadn’t planned for a military option.  And that 
planning did begin, I gather, as soon as the, early on in the hostage crisis.  Now, I had not been 
briefed on the fact that such planning was going on, or its nature, its components, and I really 
had not focused on whether, I hadn’t focused on whether it was under way, or whether there 
should be an effort of this kind.  But, again, I began by saying that I would have thought it would 
have been a mistake not to have planned. 
   
Now, whether or not the plan that was finally develop d was the best plan that could have been 
put together, I have no military judgment on that.  And I was not a part of that planning, I was 
not a part of a consideration of options of one kind or another.  So the shaping of the plan, I 
wasn’t involved in any way whatsoever, and in no positi n to make a judgment on it.  And I 
gather it was in the course of that, the development of the plan and the consideration of the 
options and the final decisions as to its make up, that Vance’s negative attitude developed.  And 
I gather that Brzezinski had a great deal of influence on the plan and its components.  But, 
looking at it from another point of view, at the time that the decision was made to go forward 
with the military option, all other options for dealing with the crisis had come to a dead end.  The 
very last of it involved the United Nations effort through Kurt Waldheim and, you remember, 
that was tried and produced no results.  Diplomacy had come up against a dead end all across the 
board and there were the constant threats, or possibility of threats, from the Iranians about what 
might be done with the hostages.  Talk of trials, talk of possible death penalty and so on.  All of 
this was very disturbing for the president.   
 
So, and then, with respect to the military option, this was May, the nights were getting shorter 
and night time was obviously an important part of whatever plan you launched.  The nights were 
getting shorter and with respect to the helicopters and the aircraft, the air was getting warmer and 
thinner and less supportive, so that as time went on, he potential viability of the plan that had 
been put together was diminishing.  So with diplomatic initiative at a dead end and possibilities 
of using this option under pressure, the decision was made to launch it.  So we lost I think six or 
eight men in the process, in Desert One.  So my reaction to it publicly at that point, and this was 
before I knew that Vance had resigned, the president called us down to the White House to brief 
us on it and to tell us what had happened, and of course he was very deeply concerned that it had 
failed, I felt that he had no choice but to undertake it.  But this is after the fact and without 
having been exposed to it in the way that Vance had been.   
 
Now, after the fact, after this thing was all over, I came to believe that the fact that the effort had
been made was one of the factors that may have contributed to the Iranian’s decision to 
negotiate.  They couldn’t be sure we wouldn’t try again, and they couldn’t be sure that another 
effort might be more successful.  I don’t know to what extent that may have had an influence on 
them, but I, I mean, it was too bad to lose the livs of those six or eight soldiers, but other than 
that, the failure of the mission was not that profound.  The one negative impact its failure might 
have had, or the fact that it was undertaken, might have resulted in the dispersal of the hostages 
so that it would have been more difficult to find them in the event of another effort.   
 
CB:  Was the military option ever considered again? 
 
EM:  No, not to my knowledge.  Not to my knowledge.  But we certainly didn’t announce to the 
world that we weren’t considering it.  So they couldn’t be sure that we were not.  No, we 
absolutely did not consider a repetition of the military option.  What we did decide was to wait 
for the political developments in Iran to finally produce a government with which we could deal. 
 And it was in, I think in August of that year that the Madulis, or Parliament, was elected and a 
speaker of the Madulis, speaker of the hou-, Madulis was appointed, and it was at that point that 
I wrote him a letter indicating that we had mutual problems.   
 
You know, they had been asking us for an apology for all the, for the Shah’s regime, our 
contribution to it and all of that, and I simply referred to mutual grievances that we ought to be 
discussing.  And it wasn’t long after that, I think late August, early September, the dates ought to 
be confirmed, I am not sure about this, that we got word through the German foreign minister, 
Gentscher, who is still foreign minister, that he’d gotten word from the Iranians that they were 
interested in a meeting.  And we pursued that and were able to confirm the fact that they were 
indeed interested in some kind of talks.  And those talks began under the auspices of the West 
Germans, in Germany, before the election, and continued through the election and beyond so 
that, and those talks are what finally produced the rel ase of the hostages.  After the election, the 
Algerians saw, the Iranians asked to substitute the Alg rians for the West Germans, they felt 
more comfortable I guess with the Algerians.  So although it wasn’t direct face to face 
negotiations, it was negotiation through the Algerian intermediaries.  
 
And of course politically, you know, the Republicans at that time were, you know, trying to 
make an issue of two things:  one, that you never talk with hostage takers.  I don’t know how you 
ever resolve those issues unless you talk to hostage takers, but anyway that was the line, the 
Republican line at the time.  And secondly, the Shah of course had bought and paid for a lot of 
military equipment and the Republicans were sure, you know, that we would give that up to get 
the hostages, that was another issue, supposed issue.  Interesting thing is that we, there was no 
discussion between us and the Iranians on the question of those arms.  So far as I know, they 
never requested them, probably because they didn’t wan to be beholden to the great Satan, but 
in any case that never arose, and we settled it, settled the matter without dealing with that issue 
and I don’t really know what the present condition of those specific arms might be.  I would 
think there would be a lot of obsolescence.  
 
CB:  These are what, planes that we had deliv-, that the United States had delivered to the Shah? 
 
EM:  I don’t really know the details, I don’t really know the details of what it consisted of.  No, 
the, when we got to the question of, you know, on what basis do we resolve our differences, the 
principle we advanced was that if they would restore the hostages to us, we would try to restore 
their frozen assets to them.  The trouble was that a lo of those assets were in the form of bank 
accounts that had been attached by creditors of one kind or another, asserting claims of one kind 
or another, so it wasn’t as easy to restore the assts a  it was to ask them to restore the hostages.  
But that was a basic principle upon which the discus ions were based, and to deal with the 
claims we agreed to set up a claims tribunal in The Hague to sort through those, I guess literally 
thousands of claims, a process that is still ongoing, u less it’s been finally concluded.  I don’t 
think it has been finally concluded these ten years later.  
  
Anyway, it worked.  We were able to return to Iran, I think something like, oh, I forget how 
many billion dollars, but that would put some in escrow against these claims, and that was an 
agreement I think, or a provision in the agreement that if the amount of escrow money was 
exhausted that the Iranians would replenish it.  I’d have to go back and look at that agreement.  
That’s, it was a pretty technical thing.  And Warren Christopher presided over that whole 
negotiation at the time.  Had to deal with the bankers, had to deal with creditors, had to deal with 
the Iranians.  Fortunately, you know, the emergence of the electronic transfer of funds made it 
possible to implement the agreement in a very short time frame, once the agreement was 
reached, because we didn’t have a hell of a lot of time toward the end.   
 
So it was a rather steady progression, you know, from the failed hostage, failed hostage attempt, 
decision in order to await political developments in Iran, finally, once there was somebody to 
deal with, to communicate with, to make that contact, nd then a response, not too late, a month 
or so, subsequently that resulted in these indirect n gotiations.  And I don’t, I can’t remember 
how many, how many trips the Algerian emissaries had to take, you know, moving between 
Washington and Tehran before the agreement was finally buttoned down.  And they were 
excellent.  They had been involved, the three Algerian emissaries, had been involved in the 
negotiations between Algeria and DeGaulle’s governmt which led to the independence of 
Algeria, so they were seasoned diplomats.  It was re lly a pleasure to do business with them.  
They sort of filtered, you know, filtered the messages back and forth.  They didn’t act as, try to 
act as arbitrators, but they simply undertook to fil er, where, you know, by eliminating, you 
know, the hostile fringes of these exchanges.  I thoug t they did a terrific job.   
 
CB:  What was the motive of the Algerian government to get involved in this?   
 
EM:  Their motive?  Well, I think they were interested in being involved in such a, I mean, it 
gave their government visibility.  Certainly the Iranians had confidence in them, in selecting 
them, so it was a way of maintaining good relationship  and maybe improving their relationships 
with Iran, and with us.  I mean, I think almost any government would have accepted that role if 
they felt in a position to do it to lighten the burden for them, and they gained a lot of respect in 
this country, from people who counted.  I think, I now that Warren Christopher enjoyed the 
relationship he established with the Algerians, and I certainly did.  And the West Germans were 
willing to play the same role.  You know, this is not unusual, when you think of some of the 
conferences dealing with Southeast Asian issues.  Poland has been involved in that sort of thing, 
France, Canada.  Canada quite often is asked to serve in similar roles.  They do so without 
reluctance.  And you know these countries that send, that send troops in peace keeping 
situations, you know, their soldiers are under pressure, in dan-, in risk of their lives.  You think 
of the United Nations forces that have been in Lebanon, that also served in. . . . (telephone 
interruption). 
 
CB:  Concerning the Iran hostage crisis, did you, did you or Warren Christopher have any direct 
dealings with Iranian emissaries? 
 
EM:  No.   
 
CB:  You just worked through the Germans, or the Algerians? 
 
EM:  Through the Algerians. 
 
CB:  When did you sense that there was some kind of breakthrough in the impasse between Iran 
and the United States over the hostages?   
 
EM:  Well, I think I’ve already indicated that the possibility, I mean, until I had written to the 
speaker of the Madulis, there had been nothing to indicate there was a possibility of a break.  
And of course when I wrote, I think he disclosed publicly in a press conference the fact that I had 
written and, I don’t know, I can’t remember to what ex ent he revealed the contents of that letter. 
 But in any case, he was not abusive in his reaction to the letter.   
 
CB:  Had you expected him to be abusive?   
 
EM:  Well, I mean, you know, the Iranian reaction to anything that the American government 
said or did on these subjects took the form of a tirade.  They never lost an opportunity to 
castigate the great Satan.  This was a typical stock in trade.  But we didn’t get any of that in 
response to my letter.  That didn’t generate any false hopes on our part, but it was a matter of 
interest.  So I guess I would say that the first indication we had that there might be a possibility 
down the road of a break was the West German foreign minister’s call to me to tell me about the 
signal he had had from the Iranians.  And so we responded, we agreed on an exchange of public 
statements that were ambiguous but which would indicate that there was indeed genuine contact 
between the Iranian government, and Khomeini, and us. 
   
We did that, and from then on, the one setback in that whole process was the weekend before our 
election when, when the Iranian Madulis convened and there was a lot of public debate about the 
hostages.  And we had to go through a weekend of television review of, you know, the burning 
of the United States flag and, you know, all the footage that had been generated at the time of the 
hostage taking.  And that didn’t help Carter’s election chances very much.  If they’d kept it quiet, 
we might have done better, but, in other words, that was their way, I guess, of indicating publicly 
that they were seriously considering the possibility of a resolution.  But the language in that 
debate didn’t always encourage us to believe that.  We couldn’t be sure whether or not their 
going through this public demonstration of involvement was for the purpose of helping or 
hurting Carter’s chances for reelection.   
 
The Republicans, I guess, like to say, well, I won’t say that because I’m not sure about that.  In 
any case, whatever their motive was, the effect on the election here in this country was dramatic 
as revealed by the polls.  I think on the Friday or Saturday before elections, the, it seemed to be 
about even, according to the polls, but the election was a walk away.  The polls, just before 
election day, just showed a dramatic drop in Carter’s prospects.  He knew the day, the day 
before, the day before election that he had lost, which is a dispiriting thing.   
 
But in any case, after election, we, we made the change in intermediaries and the talks continued 
on a continuing basis.  At least one exchange a week, I think, as I recall it, one exchange every 
two weeks, trying to hammer out the principles and the elements of a resolution.  And all this 
happened, the messages from Iran always seemed to arrive on a Saturday before the Sunday of 
all the talk shows, you know, and I’d usually be scheduled on Meet the Press or Face the Nation, 
Issues and Answers, only to have to publicly react to some development, alleged development or 
supposed development.  The most dramatic was when the Iranians delivered a message which 
sounded like a request for a twenty four billion dollar ransom payment.  That’s how the press 
tended to describe it, and I had to cool that one off.  And obviously we did, we never did pay 
them anything like twenty-four billion dollars. 
 
CB:  Now, did the issue of the return of the Shah himself, or his wealth, come up in negotiations 
when you were secretary of state? 
 
EM:  I don’t think so.  I think the Shah died, let’s see, what is this, I think the date of his death is 
in here.  Marshall Tito died according, on May 4th.  But it didn’t, in any case.  I was just trying 
to place it and I thought I saw something in here.  Ah, July 27th, the Shah dies in Egypt. 
 
CB:  So that was, the return of the Shah was a moot issue.  What about his assets?  Did the 
Iranians demand the return of his, because they had alleged that he had salted away quite a bit of 
money. 
 
EM:  I think they did.  Incidentally, on those details, under the auspices of the New York Bar, 
Warren Christopher and others who were involved in, the team that we created to deal with all 
those issues, resulted in a book, I don’t know if you’ve run into that or not, on the hostage crisis. 
 Ought to try to get a copy of it for the, because those answers will be found there, and I don’t 
want to rely on my memory, but yes, constantly I think the question of the Shah’s assets were, 
they cer-, part of the discussion as I recall it. 
 
CB:  I have one more question on the Iranian hostage crisis.  I was always curious in following 
this why the Iranians didn’t release the hostages before the November elections on the grounds 
that Ronald Reagan might be more difficult to deal with than Jimmy Carter.  Do you have any 
sense of why the Iranians kept the hostages until after the election?  Indeed, didn’t release them 
until the day of the inauguration. 
 
EM:  Well, must be that they weren’t impressed by thatargument.  After all, in that weekend’s 
demonstration before election they, although it’s, I’ve said a moment ago that we can’t be sure 
whether they were doing that to help or hurt Carter, they couldn’t have done anything more 
likely to encourage the election of Reagan than that demonstration.  So if it was his election that, 
that they were worried about, it certainly didn’t affect their behavior that weekend, as far as I can 
see.  No, the Republicans liked, liked to, some Republicans, I don’t want to blanket them all with 
that kind of a statement, but a lot of people were saying at that time that, that Reagan would be 
tougher on them than we were, etc.  That kind of argument was made but I can’t, I really have no 
reason to believe that it affected their attitude in the negotiations.  After all, no, I just don’t see 
that, Chris.   
 
CB:  Okay, turning to another part of the world where you’ve had a recent interest, Southeast 
Asia, the, in 1979 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthr w the Khmer Rouge regime, which 
was supported by the Chinese.  The Chinese launched a border, an incursion on Vietnam’s 
border, and the position of the Carter administration was in opposition to the Vietnamese 
intervention, or the invasion of Cambodia.  What were your thoughts at the time, in 1980 when 
you entered the State Department, on the Carter administration’s policies towards Southeast 
Asia, specifically towards Vietnam? 
 
EM:  Well, when I came in as secretary I don’t think the Carter administration had made  a 
decision.  Well, the Carter, the Carter administration’s reaction to the invasion was that it was a 
demonstration of the expansionist tendencies of the Vietnamese government.  I think that’s a 
matter of fact, pure and simple.  And I guess that was my reaction as well.  The provocation for 
the invasion, as I’ve learned since, is that the Khmer Rouge had been launching incursions, 
military incursions, bloody incursions into Vietnam across their common border.  Now, at the 
time, I’m not sure that we gave Vietnam the credit for whatever credit there might be involved in 
reaction to those incursions as the motive for their invasion.  We tended to believe that it was 
simply Vietnam’s historical tendency and, hostility to Cambodia and historical tendency to try to 
expand its reach.  And that’s what we were against.  The fact that in the process the Vietnamese 
deposed the Khmer Rouge was not really focused on particularly.  I don’t know to what extent 
we were aware at that time of the genocide that had taken place.  I don’t recall being aware of it 
and I don’t think the Western world was aware of it at hat time. 
 
CB:  Well, there had been reports ... 
 
EM:  There had been reports, no question about that, but I don’t, here I’m talking about 
something that happened twelve years ago, eleven, tw lve years ago, but I don’t think that our 
policy was, appropriately took into account that fact.  In other words, we didn’t credit Vietnam 
with the motive of invading in order to liberate the Cambodian people from the Khmer Rouge.  I 
don’t think we believed that that was Vietnam’s motive.  So it was sort of an incidental result, 
whatever awareness we had at the time, that genocide ha  taken place.  Not that we had a very 
high opinion of Pol Pot, I don’t think we did, but the fact that in effect the Khmer Rouge and 
their murderous regime were deposed was an incidental result of the invasion and not the motive 
of the invasion.   
      
And so the result, you know, then the ASEAN countries of course, which have always been 
fearful of Vietnam, also saw it as evidence of Vietnamese expansion and these countries, you 
know who they are, they are Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, 
six of them, they were anxious to get U.S. support for heir view of this situation and China was 
with them at that time.  And so the result was thatere was a common agreement on the part of 
the ASEAN countries, you know, to recognize the coaliti n which, I don’t know whether the 
coalition was in place in 1980. But the result of it all was that they all supported the idea of 
giving the United Nations seat of Cambodia to the Kmer Rouge and the non-communist 
coalition.  That was their idea of a way to restrain, or to make Vietnam pay a price for its 
invasion.  And we concurred in that, I think, and I think that decision on our part took place 
while I was secretary.   
 
CB:  Now the Chinese argued, at least publicly, that te invasion of Cambodia by the 
Vietnamese was an extension of Soviet power.  Was th t a consideration in the formulation of 
the U.S. response to the Vietnamese invasion? 
 
EM:  Oh, well, I think we still retained the conviction we had throughout the Vietnam War.  The 
Soviet Union was the principal, although we regarded China as a supporter of the Vietnam-, of 
the North Vietnamese, too.  We didn’t see it as just a Soviet, I mean, China’s position in this 
whole situation has been a shifting one over the centuries.  Until about 1000 B.C. I think China 
controlled Vietnam, or Indo China as it was then called.  I think that’s what it was then called.  
And the Vietnamese shook loose from that control for m st of the next millennium.   It’s rather 
strange that during the Vietnam War we regarded China as a supporter of North Vietnam and 
since then, of course, China has been a supporter of the Khmer Rouge.  It’s both, you know, both 
relationships have a deep history that is not fully explainable. 
 
CB:  Mentioning the Soviet Union, at this, during the period you were Secretary of State, the 
Soviets had, well, before you became, just before yu became Secretary of State, the Soviets had 
occupied Afghanistan, which had been, of course becam  a major issue in U.S. - Soviet relations. 
 And the United States imposed certain sanctions on the Soviet Union and at least enunciated 
support for the Afghan, the growing rebellion in Afghanistan.  In your opinion, do you, what do 
you think was behind the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?  Now, again, there’s a division of 
opinion in, one group would argue that the Soviets were simply trying to shore up a tottering 
Communist regime that had no basis of support, others argued that this was one step in a long 
historic drive by the Soviet Union, the Russians, to gain a foothold in the Middle East, and 
particularly foreign water ports.  What was your view or response at the time, in 1980, to the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? 
 
EM:  Well, I thought, I think we saw it then as the latter, you know, the latter rationale that you 
just stated.  And it was that point of view that I presented to Gromyko when we had our first talk 
about the whole situation.  He was curious as to why e were concerned about it and my answer 
to him was that it was the geography of the situation hat concerned us.  What their actual motive 
was, I think you’ve still got to see it in that way.   
 
The Soviets, you know, following WWII, you know, had designs on Iran at that time.  As a 
matter of fact, we formed the Alliance with Greece and Turkey at the time, our Greece and 
Turkey policy under Truman for the purpose of creating a deterrent to Soviet expansion in that 
area.  So the Soviets historically for a long time had been reaching out toward Iran and we were 
concerned about that all through my term as secretary, the possibility that the Soviets might 
move into Iran.  They were, there were troop movements, troop buildups along that border while 
we were, during that period, at the same time that there were buildups along the Polish border.  I 
mean, we were concerned about both and not entirely sure as to which of those perceived options 
the Soviets were playing games with.  But we certainly felt that they were, and the Afghanistan 
invasion could well have been part of a broader objective which included Iran ultimately, and a 
warm water port, as you put it.  I think that’s about it.   
 
Incidentally, I had an Afghanistan taxi driver in New York yesterday.  He promised to turn on 
the air conditioning, and appeared to, and then nothi g happened and I finally said, your air 
condition doesn’t seem to work.  He said, my air condition’s working very well.  So, where is it? 
 But in any case, when he dropped me off, I told him who I was and he said, oh, I know, he said, 
I’m from Afghanistan.  So there you are.  Taxi drive s in Washington and New York come from 
all over that area, Iranians, Afghanistanis, Pakistni , and they all recognize me. 
 
CB:  Were you afraid that the Soviets would intervene in Poland? 
 
EM:  Yes, we were.  Definitely we were concerned about that.  That was a very, very, an area of 
very great concern on the part of all of our NATO allies as well as ourselves.  They were all 
concerned about it.  I remember we, the last meeting we had of NATO foreign ministers in 
December of 1980 ... 
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CB:  There, you were mentioning at the last meeting of NATO foreign ministers, you were 
concerned about possible Soviet intervention in Poland.  What were, what did the United States 
propose to do about it, if that eventuality happened?  I mean, what could the United States do 
about that? 
 
EM:  You mean, what would we ultimately do about that?  You know, what you might 
ultimately do about such situations is a question that you don’t necessarily decide early on.  Just 
as at present time in the Persian Gulf.  What will e ultimately do?  Will we blockade, for 
example?  Well, the suggestion that we may is certainly raised and left to rest there as a 
deterrent.  Whether we actually will, you know, you won’t know until you get to that point.  
Whether we would have gone into WWIII if they had invaded Poland is a question we never 
decided as such, of course.  And so what you try to do is to find ways to express the seriousness 
of our concern that they appeared to be preparing for that kind of a development, or that kind of 
intervention, and their mobilization of forces along the Polish border of course gave grounds for 
that concern.  And I forget exactly what communique or what position we announced publicly at 
that time, as an Alliance, to deter the Russians, but whatever it was it seemed to be sufficient at 
the time.   
 
CB:  Now, turning to a, closer to home, in 1979 and 1980 the issue of the turmoil in Central 
America began to come to the fore.  There’d been a revolution in Nicaragua and an incipient 
civil war in El Salvador.  In December of 1980 four American church women were murdered 
and the best evidence suggests that they were murdered by members of the Salvadoran military.  
What do you recall about that incident and also, nine days after the murder of the church women, 
the opposition Marti front, guerilla front in El Salv dor, launched an offensive and the Carter 
administration released emergency funds to help the Salvadoran government withstand that 
offensive. What do you recall in terms of the formulation of U.S. policy towards Central 
America, and specifically El Salvador at this time?   
 
EM:  Well, we were concerned, as everybody else was then and as people still are concerned in 
El Salvador as to whether or not, and to what extent if at all, the military, the right wing military 
had been involved in those incidents.  
 
Duarte, Antonio Duarte was a part of the government at that time.  I think there was a group, a 
junta, and he was a member.  But there was always a question a  to how much influence he had 
or to what extent he was able to deter, you know, the use of these death squads in El Salvador.  I 
know we undertook to limit the amount and kind of military aid we would give.  We tried to 
avoid lethal aid at the time, as I remember.  Helicopters were I think a special item that we were 
concerned about.  It’s a fact, of course, that this guerilla war was under way and the question as 
to who was supporting the guerillas.  I think we were reasonably sure the Nicaraguans were to 
some extent, and the Cubans to some extent, and it was our policy to provide the government of 
El Salvador with the resources to enable them to resist those incursions.  And yet at the same 
time there was this concern that the, you know, the right wing, the radical group, were also 
involved in that internal struggle for power and then that, it was always difficult to pinpoint the 
perpetrators of those crimes.  And so we tended to be very cautious about the amount and kind of 
military aid we would give.  
 
Now that changed, of course, after the Reagan administration came in.  I think they were less 
reluctant to provide military assistance.  Ultimately Duarte did get elected in his own right as 
president.  That produced a kind of improved situation hereafter, but that was long after we had 
left office.  At the time we left office we were, we really hadn’t been able to satisfy ourselves 
that the way we were handling the situation was producing anything very constructive.  At that 
time also, I think, we were supporting an aid program for Nicaragua.  I think seventy five million 
dollars, something of that kind.  The program didn’t look too good, subsequently.   
 
CB:  It didn’t look too good in what sense?  That it didn’t have an impact on the Sandanista 
government, or that it had caused political problems at home?   
 
EM:  Well, both.   
 
CB:  Now, the purpose of the aid prog-, aid to Nicaragua, was that to exercise some leverage 
over the political development of the new regime? 
 
EM:  That’s right.  It was.  I don’t know, I can’t reme ber whether at that time we had, my 
memory really isn’t very good, they had finally prevailed over the Somoza forces, I think they 
had, am I correct in that? 
 
CB:  Well, the Sandanistas came to power in July of 1979.  So they were in there, I mean, they 
were in there when you came in to the state department.  But I think the government was, the 
formal government was in flux.  It had been a kind of unstable coalition of Sandanistas and non-
Sandanista opposition, opponents of Samosa.   
 
EM:  But the aid program had been created before I becam  secretary and ... 
 
CB:  How much attention were you able to pay, I mean, this all this seems to be taking place in 
the context of the Iran hostage crisis and negotiati ns.  How much time and attention were you 
as secretary able to give to the issues like Central America or Afghanistan or Southeast Asia?   
 
EM:  Well, you had to deal with them.  Ah, and I’m not sure that we’re able to do so thoroughly, 
you know, you haven’t even gotten to the unstability, instability in South Korea which also 
plagued us in that period.  So we had, you had South Korea, you had all these others that we’ve 
touched upon.   
 
No, really, what I think to make these sessions more productive, I think what I need to do is do 
some focussed reading to refresh my recollection on the period.  I just, I find myself, you know, 
too foggy in my recollection about the specifics.  I don’t know what the reading sources will be, 
or could be, that was somewhat helpful but not fully.  I’m not sure that that’s accurate, for 
example, and I’m wandering through your last question, but, (reads) “in his first significant 
speech the secretary must control the Foreign Policy Association; on July 7th the State 
Department placed less stress on human rights issues and provided for essential economic, 
social, and military aid to non-Communist nations regardless of its civil rights agenda.”  I don’t 
remember that speech.  I’m going to dig it out when I get back to Washington and see if in effect 
that, that’s an accurate one-sentence summary.  I find that ... 
 
CB:  That does seem like a major change in the Carter dminis-, the thrust of the Carter 
administration policy ...   
 
EM:  Yeah, I don’t re... 
 
CB:  ... because when Carter came into power, I mean came into office, human rights was to be 
the keystone of his foreign policy. 
 
EM:  Yeah, and I think it was.  I don’t remember that.  I really need to do some digging, Chris.  
 
CB:  Yeah.  Okay.  I just want to touch on one other ar a and then get some general reflections 
from you concerning the Middle East, other than Ira.  The, a couple of issues came, well, one, 
obviously one ongoing issue or circumstance or condition was U.S. relations with Israel.  The, 
before you came into office, President Carter had mnaged to establish a relationship between 
Sadat of Egypt and Begin of Israel.  At the time, what are your reflections on U.S. relations with 
Israel at the time?  Israel, particularly with regard to Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, it’s relations with the Arab countries, it  security needs and so forth? 
 
EM:  Well, what we were basically involved in at that time was a continuation of the peace 
process which had started with the Camp David Accords.  I think we had carried those Accords 
to the point where a peace treaty had been entered into between Egypt and Israel.  Am I correct 
in that recollection? 
 
CB:  I believe so, yes.   
 
EM:  And the next phase of the Accords were designed to begin a dialogue which would expand 
beyond Egypt and Israel and get other Arab states involved in a discussion of issues that 
hopefully could be resolved and achieve a resolution of issues involving Israel’s other neighbors, 
other than Egypt.  So to continue the peace process, which at that point really still involved only 
Egypt and Israel.  How to lay the foundation, you know, for a broader dialogue including a 
broader range of issues that impacted upon other countries.  Sol Linowitz, of course, was in 
charge of that process, and the American ambassadors to Israel and Egypt.  In the case of Egypt 
that was, that was Ambassador Atherton and in the cas of Israel, Ambassador Lewis, and 
they’re both very good.  But Israel would do provocative things that would have the effect of 
interrupting the talks between Egypt and Israel. 
 
CB:  Such as? 
 
EM:  Oh, such as, I forget the member of the Knesset, a woman, that introduced a resolution 
naming Jerusalem as the capitol of Israel.  Now that’s just calculated to inflame Arabian opinion 
at any point. Well that wasn’t a government initiatve, an Israeli government initiative but neither 
did they denounce it.  I think they were able to sidetrack it at the time and we were told, as I 
recall, that they’d, they would somehow manage to keep it sidetracked.  But there was always 
the threat, and you know, ultimately after we left of ice, the government of Israel did itself name 
Jerusalem the capitol of Israel.  I mean, that was, the status of Jerusalem was an issue that was, 
under Camp David Accords, was to be separately discussed and decided after the deliberation 
and the involvement of other states, other Arab state .  But that dialogue had never begun and 
there’s Jewish opinion that wanted to precipitate the decision and. . . . So that had the effect of 
repeatedly interrupting the continuity of the peace process and the discussions between Israel 
and Egypt.  And it led to votes in the Security Council.  There’s some reference to some of those 
votes in here, I think, that we abstained, we were abl to abstain in many of them, but I think 
ultimately we actually voted. . . . I don’t know if that vote is in here.  And I forget the resolution. 
 This is where I get lost in these discussions.  I don’t remember the, but in any case, I think 
ultimately on one resolution we did not abstain, but voted for the resolution, if my memory is 
correct, and Begin was very unhappy with me about that. 
   
But those were never any personal decisions that I m de, I mean, they were the result of 
discussions that involved the president, the vice president, Mondale, and our ambassador to the 
United Nations.  But our interest was in keeping the dialogue going, the peace process dialogue 
going, and it was damn frustrating, you know, to get th se domestic political developments in 
Israel that had the effect of interrupting those.  Because Linowitz was making some progress we 
thought, at the time, on the broader agenda, and was constantly frustrated by the inability to 
continue to establish some continuity.  I didn’t, it s not, those are not all covered adequately in 
that summary, but that’s an interesting review in its own right.  And there was a lot of that that 
took place at that time.  And we managed to keep it afloat, but, you know, I mean Sadat 
obviously was put in a box every time they did this sort of thing, Begin had his own internal 
problems with his of-, I mean, it’s a mess. 
 
CB:  Now, what was to be the, or what were your thoughts at the time on the status of 
Palestinians, both those in the occupied territories and those living as refugees in places abroad 
because that, their ultimate status, whether they’re to have a homeland or a state or whatever, 
always seemed to be the major issue, at least it was for. . . . 
 
EM:  An ever present issue that nobody has ever satisfactorily resolved, nor has any formula 
ever been, and I don’t recall that American policy ever adopted any ultimate position as to what 
the Palestinian status ought to be.  And it was just hoped, I think, that, well, not hoped.  I think 
part of the purpose of the Camp David Accords was to bring the issues that would bear upon that 
ultimate resolu-, the ultimate resolution of that question, and to focus in the context of related 
issues such as, I mean, the Camp David Accords were perceived I think as the beginning of an 
evolutionary process.  A process of evolution that would finally bring the parties into a healthier 
relationship and one that would suggest the final aswer to the status of the Palestinians.   
 
I don’t think we ever tried to impose our own, you know, a formula of our own on anybody.  I 
don’t think we were ever sure of what that ought to be, and I don’t think we, to this day, that our 
government has any established position on what the status of the Palestinians ought to be.  With 
the Intefada and this violence that has sprung up over the last few years, it’s pretty difficult to 
find, come up with an answer to it.  I don’t have an answer.  A separate state?  A confederation 
of some kind involving Jordan and the West Bank?  I mean, there have been so many attempts to 
come up with a formula that just don’t generate universal approval or support.  The situation 
over there now seems worse than it was when we left office. 
 
CB:  Was there any consideration of bringing the Palestin  Liberation Organization into any 
negotiations? 
 
EM:  Oh, no, I mean, that policy was, so long as the Pal stinians did not recognize the right of 
the State of Israel to exist, we didn’t do business with them.  That policy did not change until 
very recently.  When was it, last year?  Yes?  Lastyear that we began talking with them.  And 
now I think those talks are in suspension.  And now, given. . . . given Arafat’s support of Iraq, 
you know, in this present crisis in the Middle East, I don’t think there’ll be a resumption of those 
talks for awhile.  
 
CB:  I’d like to wrap this up with something that historians I think like to do more for, to get a 
handle on things, is kind of ask you a ‘what if’ question.  That is to say, if Jimmy Carter had 
been reelected in November 1980 and, I’m assuming you would have stayed on as Secretary of 
State for a good while, what areas, or what, let’s put it this way: what do you see the major areas 
for taking initiatives, or major areas of concern once, particularly once the Iran hostage crisis had 
been resolved, and how would you have conducted the foreign policy of the United States 
different from the policy of the Reagan administration in its first term?   
 
EM:  Oh, God.  
 
CB:  That’s a big question. 
 
EM:  How do you answer a question like that?  I mean, I don’t even have at the top of my mind, 
you know, the, the, the developing status of foreign policy problems and issues beginning back 
then.  I mean, there’s certainly points of differenc s that I can recall.  You know, the attitude 
about arms control, the attitude about the SALT II reaty, for example.  Reagan never at any 
point, at any point, officially denounced the SALT II Treaty.  I think its status was, as best I can 
recall, was the decision to observe the treaty withou  ratifying it, and ultimately four or five years 
down the road he rejected it.  Then roughly the same ti e, no, earlier than that, he announced the 
strategic defense initiative designed to build thisouter space shield against nuclear weapons.   
 
So there are plenty of points of difference that I took with him, publicly and otherwise. And at 
one point I worked with Nixon and Howard Baker and Jim Baker to try to launch a visit to the 
Soviet Union.  A Muskie-Nixon, or Nixon-Muskie visit to try to, you know, probe the 
possibilities of a resumption of strategic talks.  It was about that time that Reagan himself 
changed his own view about the importance of arms control talks and he initiated his own at that 
time.   
 
Well, what the hell good is it going to do me to try to reconstruct in my mind how that period 
would have changed, been different if I’d been there.  I mean, I was for the SALT II Treaty, I 
was for arms control, I was chairman of the Arms Control Sub-Committee of the Foreign 
Relations Committee when I was in the Senate, and so I was interested in the arms control 
process.  And I was opposed to the strategic defens initiative because I, number one, I didn’t 
think it could work, I didn’t think there was any way to make it work, and I never heard a 
scientist argue that it was possible.  But that’s all history now.  Now we’re in a different ball 
game and I assume that finally the strategic defens initiative is, I guess we’re still providing 
some money to continue, continue the research.  I suspect that won’t last very long.  I can’t 
believe that with all the budgetary constraints that we have to meet today that that program will 
last very long in the present context of east - west r lations.  So I don’t know how you deal with 
that question.   
 
In Nicaragua I took issue with the administration handling of that situation.  You know, things 
like the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the renunciation of the, of the ah, of the ah, compulsory 
jurisdiction of the World Court, and other issues that flowed out of that situation, I disagreed 
with the administration.  But it’s very hard to say where we would be now if a different road than 
that the Reagan administration chose to travel had been traveled.  It’s very difficult to do.   
 
So I would say we would have differed on arms control, we would have differed on the handling 
of the Central American situation.  Once the administration embraced the arms control thing, 
then I’d have to give the administration credit for its shift in policy and the results that followed, 
although Reagan never did concede that SDI should be terminated.  And you think back now, 
you know, on what, at what the defense spending of that decade did to our budgetary problems, 
the national deficit, and our ability today to, you know, to play a more effective, productive role 
in Eastern Europe, for example, and in Cambodia.  We don’t have the resources to do the things 
that we’ve been, we’ve said we’ve been wanting to do all this time, in large part because I think 
of excessive spending for defense.  And yet there will al ays be a historical argument as to 
whether or not the change in the Russian perception of the east - west relationship was effected 
by that defense buildup on our part.  My own view is that, that the So-, the problems with the 
Soviet economy were a greater factor than, maybe exacerbated by the amount of their defense 
spending.  But nevertheless, I think that motivated Gorbachev in a way that might have 
motivated him even if our level of defense spending had been less.  
  
And then there’s a whole question of whether or not, y u know, the money we spent on defense, 
on the defense posture, on the defense structure, that we’ve bought with all that money is 
relevant to problems like that in the Persian Gulf at the present time.  I doubt very much, you 
know, that the stealth bomber has much to do with the power that we project in the Middle East 
now, or the Trident submarine.  In other words, the defense buildup, the emphasis of the defense 
buildup doesn’t seem very relevant to the needs of today.  Problems of Eastern Europe, the 
threat, the dangers of the Persian Gulf, so there you are.  You can second guess until the cows 
come home and you can’t be sure that you would havebeen right.   
 
CB:  One last question, this sort of gets beyond the Secretary of State period.  What’s your, what 
is your view on the recent events in the Middle East, particularly President Bush’s response in 
sending large numbers of U.S. forces over there? 
 
EM:  Well, I, my view is that he’s on target.  I think he’s done what he had to do.  I don’t, 
whether some lesser level of deterrents would deter Saddam, we’re not sure that what Bush has 
done will deter him.  No, I take no exception to what e’s done.  Now, that doesn’t mean that I 
have any certainty that the ultimate result will be a resolution of the, of the confrontation.  My 
own feeling is that Saddam has, you know, Saddam’s objectives haven’t changed one iota at all, 
you know.  His timing may;  he may decide that he can’t do what he might otherwise had 
planned to do.  If he had planned to invade Saudi Arabia, he may be deterred from that.  Whether 
or not he can be persuaded to pull back out of Kuwait, he’s already plundered Kuwait, I think, 
pretty decisively with, you know, with electronic transfer of wealth.  I suspect he has really 
stolen Kuwait blind in the weeks that he’s been there.  I think he must have been concentrating 
on transferring that Kuwaiti wealth in any way that e can to his own bank account, figuratively 
speaking.  No, I think he has long wanted to be the dominant Arab figure, the dominant Arab 
leader in the Gulf.  Number one because he’s hungry for power, number two, that would give 
him control of the oil resources of the Gulf area which would give, make him a, you know, a 
very disturbing force in the world economy.  I think all of that’s what he’s been wanting to do.   
 
I think he has long coveted, not just the oil well, the oil resources that he shared with Kuwait, but 
Kuwait itself.  I think he has always argued that Kuwait was once a part of Iraq and should be a 
part of Iraq again.  I don’t think he’s given up tha  objective simply because we’ve moved these 
forces in.  He may be deterred from staying there fo  the time being, but if he moved out, you 
know, he would simply be awaiting another day.  And of course he has indicated his 
determination to become a nuclear power.  That makes him an even more frightful risk down the 
road.  Chemical weapons and all of that.  I think he’s just one of those figures that history 
produces from time to time whose hunger for power, all that can bring, as he perceives it, you 
know, makes him virtually immune to any change.  No, I think we’re in a very bad pickle.  And 
what will we do, I mean, you will begin to get disagreements now as various options for 
avoiding war, or the possibility of war, are presented to Bush by King Hussein, by Saddam, and 
now this initiative toward Iran, what will that do?  Well, Iran, what will Iran’s attitude be?  And 
these economic sanctions?  All very interesting.   
 
CB:  Okay, well, thank you very much, Secretary Muskie, I r ally appreciate this.  I think that 
has been, this has been very informative in filling out a ... 
 
EM:  I think we’ve got to make them more productive, I don’t know. 
 
End of Interview 
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